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1. Introduction
That specialization and division of labor among firms promote economic welfare is
Ž .almost an article of faith for economists. Smith’s 1776 legacy, passed through Stigler
Ž .1951 , is that when the optimal scale of production of an input is larger than the optimal
size of the user firms, a specialized supplier can produce the input more efficiently
because it can spread the fixed cost over a larger volume of output. Hence, division of
labor is more extensive in larger markets. In turn, a more efficient production of the
Ž .input induces the downstream industry to grow more rapidly Young, 1929 .
But while the literature has typically focused on the vertical division of labor within
an industry, this paper points out that an important and almost unexplored part of the
story lies in the benefits that a division of labor in one market can generate for other
markets. Specifically, we focus on how division of labor in one country has beneficial
effects for other countries. We argue that when division of labor in a country gives rise
to upstream technology suppliers, other countries can benefit as well. Thus, if technol-
ogy suppliers develop in one country first, then, once the technology is developed, these
Žtechnology suppliers can sell it to other countries at a small incremental cost especially
.if compared with the cost of developing the technology in the first place . In this way,
technology developed in leading countries can AspilloverB to follower countries.
To examine this issue we study investment in chemical plants in less developed
countries during the 1980s. The chemical industry provides an ideal test-bed. Beginning
in the 1930s and continuing into the 1960s, the modern chemical industry in the
Ž .developed countries henceforth ‘first world’ grew rapidly. This stimulated the growth
of firms that specialized in the design and engineering of the chemical processes, the
Ž .so-called ‘specialized engineering firms’ SEFs , which are similar to the software
engineering and computer consultancy firms that are more visible in the American
economy today. SEFs have been important reservoirs of expertise in chemical technolo-
gies, which they provide in the form of engineering services to chemical firms. In some
cases, SEFs have also developed radical process innovations but for the most part, they
supply improved versions of existing technologies packaged with engineering and
design services. Other SEFs offered construction services in addition to engineering
know-how. In the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, as a modern chemical industry
emerged in the developing countries, it benefited from the presence of these technology
suppliers. Simply put, the growth of the chemical industry in the first world created an
upstream sector, which later spurred the growth of the chemical industry in the
developing countries.1
As a guide to our empirical results, we develop a simple model. The model assumes
that a larger number of technology suppliers increase the net surplus to buyers from
investing in a chemical plant. This is a natural assumption since buyers should benefit
from being able to choose from a larger pool of suppliers, and is consistent with a large
set of economic explanations that variously emphasize reduced search costs, reduced
1 The story of SEFs and their role in the growth of the chemical industry is told in greater detail in Arora
Ž . Ž .and Gambardella 1998 . See also Freeman 1968 .
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bargaining power of sellers, and a better ‘match’ between the needs of buyers and the
technology. The main result of the model is that if the existing SEFs in the first world
are also potential suppliers of technology to developing countries, then the larger the
number of first world SEFs in a given market for chemical process technology, the
greater is the investment in that market in the developing countries.
The model also predicts that the larger is the number of first world SEFs, the greater
is the number of plants in developing countries where engineering services are ‘bought’
from SEFs, and the smaller the number of plants whose engineering services are ‘made’
in-house by the chemical firms. Moreover, the impact of an increase in the supply of
SEFs is more pronounced for companies that have higher cost of ‘making’ the
technology in-house. This suggests that SEFs are more beneficial for local third world
companies than for the multinational enterprises that may also invest in these markets.
We test these propositions using data on chemical plant investments in 136 leading
chemical technologies and 38 developing countries. These are drawn from a novel and
comprehensive data set of more than 20 000 chemical plants announced and constructed
during the 1980s worldwide.
Section 2 provides the conceptual underpinnings of our approach and links it to the
literature on technology, spillovers and growth. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4
discusses the empirical specification and presents our empirical results. Section 5
summarizes our findings and concludes the paper. Appendix A describes our data set.
2. Markets for technology, international spillovers and the transmission of growth
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. Our emphasis on the lower
cost of using technologies compared with the cost of developing them is similar in spirit
Ž .to the literature on endogenous growth e.g., Romer, 1990, 1996 . Following Griliches
Ž . Ž .1979 and Jaffe 1986 , there is a well-established literature on technology spillovers,
Ž .and Coe and Helpman 1995 provide evidence of international technological spillovers
Ž .see also Eaton and Kortum, 1996 .
Unlike the empirical literature on spillovers, we do not examine the effects of
spillovers on total factor productivity but on the flow of investments, because we do not
have measures of the total factor productivity at this disaggregate level. However, our
paper moves beyond the simple observation that technological spillovers exist, and
identifies a mechanism through which they take place—namely, the intermediation of an
upstream sector that sells technology inputs through a full-fledged market for technol-
ogy.2 Both real and pecuniary effects may be involved here: SEFs may imply lower
technology transfer costs for developing countries, and competition among them may
lower the price as well, a purely pecuniary effect. Rich as our data are, we cannot
empirically distinguish between the two mechanisms. Thus, although our formalism
focuses on the pecuniary externality, real externalities are likely to be involved as well.
2 In other words, some of what appear to be AspilloversB may in fact be market mediated knowledge flows.
Ž .In a recent paper, Zucker et al. 1998 find that in biotechnology market mechanisms involving individual
scientists may account for what appeared to be knowledge spillovers from universities to local firms.
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The nature of the mechanism we study is similar to the one highlighted by the recent
Žliterature on ‘general-purpose technologies’ Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman
.and Trajtenberg, 1996 . Such technologies have high fixed costs, but they can be applied
repeatedly at low incremental cost. This leads to spillovers across industries in which the
growth of one user sector benefits other user sectors through the intermediation of the
general-purpose technology industry. Our paper shows that this argument can be
extended to the transmission of growth across countries, and it provides empirical
evidence of these mechanisms.
It is natural to ask at this point whether our story is not simply a story about
international trade. It is, but with one difference. While the standard Heckscher–Ohlin
trade model locates comparative advantage in natural resources or factor endowments,
we locate it in the fact that chemical engineering services are based on cumulative
Ž .learning and experience, and that the fixed costs of acquiring this expertise are already
sunk when the developing country markets arise. Put differently, the first world has a
comparative advantage in engineering services because first-world engineering firms
Ž .were founded more than 50 and in some cases, more than a 100 years ago in response
to the growth of the oil and chemical sectors in their own countries.3
By stressing the historical sequence in the rise of new markets, our perspective also
Ž .differs somewhat from Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991 , who argue that international
economic integration increases growth because, with integration, the fixed cost of
producing ‘ideas’ can be spread over a larger market. In our model, integration is
beneficial to the follower countries even though the number of SEFs in the first world
does not increase when the first world and developing country markets are integrated.
Although analytically convenient, our primary reason for assuming that SEFs do not
develop in response to growth in developing countries is that it is more faithful to
history. Most SEFs arose to serve the first world market, not the developing country
markets that did not as yet exist.
ŽFinally, our paper is related to the literature on the product life cycle e.g., Vernon,
.1979 , whereby as technologies or products mature, production is transferred from the
first world to developing countries. This literature has focused on one mechanism
Ž .through which this transfer occurs—multinational enterprises MNEs . This focus has
often been justified by the assumption that while downstream products are tradable,
Ž .upstream inputs are not e.g., Nadiri, 1993; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996 . In fact, in the
chemical industry as in many other high-tech industries, a key upstream input—intangi-
ble knowledge and expertise—is easier to move across locations, while the final
Ž .products chemicals such as ammonia and ethylene are costly to transport. MNEs are
undoubtedly an important vehicle for technology transfer and for the growth of the host
countries. However, when technologies are based on systematic body of knowledge like
chemical engineering, MNEs are not the only, or even the most efficient, way of
transferring technology. Instead, as in the chemical industry, specialized technology
3 Incidentally, this also implies that at the time, the first world market size was much larger than that of the
third world.
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suppliers competing amongst themselves can be the predominant means of technology
transfer.
3. The theoretical framework
3.1. Description of the model
Fig. 1 summarizes the two effects that we highlight in our model.
First, the growth of the first world market for a given chemical process encourages
the rise of engineering firms specialized in the design of chemical plants for that
Ž .process. This result, which we formally prove in our working paper Arora et al., 1996 ,
Žis completely intuitive. It only requires that entry as an SEF has a fixed cost corre-
.sponding to the cost of acquiring technical expertise , and that the price–cost margin
Ž .profit per unit of output of an SEF decline with the number of SEFs in that sector.
The second effect is from the SEFs in the first world to the size of the developing
country market. To see this, suppose that first world SEFs did not exist. Then, apart
from relying on multinationals, either developing country firms would have to provide
the services themselves or rely on domestic SEFs that may exist. In either case,
developing country firms would face very high costs. Having fewer SEFs to choose
from increases search costs, lowers the bargaining power of the buyer, and reduces the
likelihood of getting a more advanced or appropriate technology. As a result, the
expected surplus of setting up a plant would be lower, and this implies lower investment
in chemical plants. Given the high transportation costs for many chemical products, this
would imply slower growth of chemicals, and industrial activity more generally.
This simple story relies strongly on the assumption that the critical input is easily
‘tradable’ across countries. It is then important to understand why is this input tradable.
Even though an ammonia plant in the US is a different object from an ammonia plant in
India, what remains unchanged are the basic principles of how an ammonia plant should
be designed and engineered. Clearly, applying what one has learned in one place in
another is not always easy, and the literature has shown that technology transfer is not
Ž .costless e.g., Teece, 1977 . Such costs are likely to depend on the very nature of the
Fig. 1. The transmission of growth impulses.
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Ž .knowledge embodied in the technology Arrow, 1962 , with tacit and less articulated
knowledge being more difficult to transfer, but also on the Aabsorptive capacityB of the
Ž .recipient firm Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 . However, the important point is that the
transfer cost be smaller than the cost of developing the technology, an assumption that
fits especially well in the context of engineering services. It is in this sense that the fixed
cost of developing or inventing the technology is paid by the industries or countries that
emerge earlier, while the industries or countries that come later pay only the marginal
cost.
This also points to the importance of independent suppliers that do not produce the
4 Ž .downstream product. Downstream producers chemical firms are less likely to sell
Ž .technology or other key inputs to other producers. Unlike upstream specialists SEFs ,
they have to offset the gains from selling technology against the lost profits in the
downstream product. Thus, in addition to the classical gains from productivity improve-
ments, specialization and division of labor can have other benefits for industrial growth,
which are sometimes overlooked.
3.2. The model
We develop a simple stylized model to motivate our empirical analysis, which
focuses on the investment decision of chemical firms in developing countries. We posit
that the first world market for chemical process technology has already emerged and a
division of labor achieved. In other words, we take as given the number of SEFs, k that
have entered the market for engineering services in the first world. It would be easy to
endogenize k and show that it increases with the size of the market in the first world
Ž .see Arora et al., 1996 . We assume that first world SEFs can costlessly supply
developing countries, with technology-specific costs already sunk.5 Therefore, the
number of SEFs that can potentially serve the developing country market is equal to k.
Note that k is independent of the developing country market size.6 We also assume that
SEFs are symmetric ex-ante.
4 Such specialized suppliers are also present in other industries, such as steel and power plants, but the
division of labor there is not as extensive and widespread as in chemicals. As discussed elsewhere, the nature
of the chemical technology, the development of chemical engineering as a discipline, and events in the history
Žof the industry are important reasons why SEFs are more prominent in chemicals see Arora and Gambardella,
.1998 . Note also how the story of SEFs parallels that of the extensive division of labor that we find today in
many high-tech industries like software or biotechnology.
5 Ž .As we have discussed earlier, technology transfer is not costless Teece, 1977 . Our model can be easily
generalized to one where SEFs have to bear two types of fixed costs: product-specific, which are already sunk,
and country-specific, which have to be incurred for each country that the SEF supplies. Results are unchanged
provided that product-specific fixed costs are larger than country-specific fixed costs. See our working paper
Ž .for further details Arora et al., 1996 .
6 Strictly speaking, this is true only if the size of the LDC market is too small to induce further entry of
SEFs. Also, we are assuming that first-world SEFs are not fully forward-looking. Else they would anticipate
Ž .that a given LDC market would arise in the future and they would adjust their optimal investment entry
decision. Neither assumption is formally necessary for LDCs to benefit from first world SEFs.
6
Turning to the developing country market, we denote by N the exogenous potential
demand for chemical plant for a particular type in a given market. For simplicity,
assume that the investment decision of a given chemical company in a given plant is
independent of the investment decision in any other plant, even by the same user. When
considering whether to invest in a new plant, each downstream firm has three choices. It
Ž .can either not invest and hence earn zero , or it can ‘buy’ engineering services from
Ž .  4SEFs, or it can ‘make’ engineer the plant by itself. We denote by Vs B,M,f the set
of possible alternatives where B stands for a plant bought from the upstream technologi-
cal sector, M for in-house engineering and f for no investment. Also, let SsBDM
where S denotes the observed size of the developing country market.
Ž .Let p be the net surplus to a given buyer chemical firm from a plant supplied byn
 4the SEF n, ns 1, 2, . . . , k . We assume that p is ex-post idiosyncratic to then
buyer–seller match. Therefore, p is an iid. random variable with distribution functionn
Ž .  4 Ž . kŽ .G P . Also, let zsMax p ,p . . . ,p . Then, Pr zF t sG t , is the probability that1 2, k
the net surplus from running a plant bought from the upstream sector is less or equal
than t. Finally, for any chemical firm let a be the net surplus from an in-house
Ž .technology and let a be distributed according to the cumulative function F P .
 4If Max z,a G0, the firm will invest in the plant. Moreover, if zGa the firm will
buy the engineering services; and if z-a it will supply them in-house. We show first
that the greater the number of SEFs, the greater is the number of plants that are
Ž .constructed. The expected number of plants, E size , in a given developing country is:
E size sN Pr VsS 1Ž . Ž . Ž .
where
Pr VsS s1yF 0 Gk 0 2Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
Ž .Result 1. The total investment in a given developing country market, E size , is
Ž .increasing in the number of potential technology suppliers, k.
Ž .Proof. By taking first differences with respect to k in expression 2 we get:
kE sizeNkq1 yE sizeNk sN F 0 G 0 1yG 0 )0 3Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 4
I
Ž . Ž .It is also easy to see from Eq. 3 that E size is concave in k, so that the marginal
increase in investment diminishes with k. We next show that SEFs increase the
probability of ‘buy’ and decrease the probability of ‘make’. One can write the expected
Ž .number of plants that are bought from the upstream technological sector, E buy , and
Ž .the expected number of plants that are made in house by the chemical firms, E make :
E buy sN Pr VsB 4Ž . Ž . Ž .
E make sN Pr VsM 5Ž . Ž . Ž .
where
`
k kPr VsB s1yF 0 G 0 y G t dF t 6Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .H
0
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and
`
kPr VsM s G t dF t 7Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .H
0
Ž . Ž < . Ž < . Ž .Using DE buy rDk'E buy kq1 yE buy k and similarly for DE size rDk and
Ž .DE make rDk we can state our second result:
Ž Ž . . Ž Ž . . Ž Ž . .Result 2. DE buy rDk ) DE size rDk )0) DE make rDk .
Ž Ž . . Ž Ž . . Ž Ž . .Proof. Note that DE buy rDk s DE size rDk q DE make rDk . Then, by tak-
Ž .ing first differences in expression 4 with respect to k one obtains:
`D E buy D size D E sizeŽ . Ž . Ž .
ks y G t y1 G t dF t ) 8Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .H
Dk Dk Dk0
I
Our final result develops an implication of the theory that is not obvious and so
provides an additional test for the theory itself. Consider any variable x that increases
Žthe net surplus from running an in-house engineered plant i.e., increases the profitability
. Ž . Ž .of the ‘make’ strategy . Formally, we assume that x Gx implies F t; x FF t; x1 2 1 2
for any t. For instance, x is likely to be higher the greater is the level of in-house
technological capability of the chemical firm. Thus, MNEs are likely to have a higher
value of x than developing country chemical firms. Intuitively, SEFs ought to be more
valuable for developing country firms than for MNEs. Our third result formalizes this
intuition.
Result 3.
D E size D E sizeŽ . Ž .
F for all x Gx .1 2Dk Dkxsx xsx1 2
Proof. One can rewrite
D E size D E sizeŽ . Ž .
y
Dk Dkxsx xsx1 2
as
kG 0 1yG 0 F 0; x yF 0; xŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .1 2
which is unambiguously non-positive.
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Sample and Õariables
To test our model we use data on 38 developing countries and 136 chemical process
technologies. This gave us 5168 ‘markets’, where the unit of observation is a process–
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country pair. Plant-level data on the 136 chemical processes were obtained from a
comprehensive database, Chemical Age Project File, which covers all new chemical
Ž .plants over 20 000 in all announced all over the world during 1980–1989. The
database and the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis are
Ž .described in more detail in Appendix A. Our 38 countries listed in Appendix A are all
the developing countries for which we could obtain complete data from two main
Ž .sources: UN Statistical Yearbook, and Barro and Lee 1994 . These countries cover
about 80% of all the chemical plants located in developing countries in the database. In
what follows we define ‘first world’ to be Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand. All the other countries are developing countries.
We constructed the following variables. SIZE is the total investment in millions ofi j
US dollars in our 136 processes i and 38 countries j. This is obtained by multiplying the
number of plants in ij by the average investment cost of a plant in process i in all
developing countries. Similarly, we construct BUY and MAKE , which are the totali j i j
dollar investments in plants whose engineering services are bought from an unaffiliated
contractor, and the total investment in plants whose engineering services are made
Ž .in-house or by an affiliated SEF . DOM and MNE are the total dollar investmentsi j i j
by developing country and multinational firms, respectively.7
SIZE FW is the total value of investment in process i in the first world. This is– i
obtained by multiplying the total number of plants in process i in the first world by
COST FW , the average investment cost of a plant in process i in the first world.– i
Ž .SEF FW is the number of firms SEFs that provide engineering services in process i– i
in the first world.
We constructed two other process-specific variables, NOVEL and PROCPAT . Theyi i
are two measures of the nature of the technology. PROCPAT is the total number ofi
1976–1997 US patents granted for the chemical process i. It covers only the patents
relating to the process itself rather than to the use of the output produced by the process.
PROCPAT is a good measure of the complexity of the process technology, and of thei
potential for multiple inputs, pathways, and final product qualities. NOVEL is thei
growth rate between the two periods 1986–1995 and 1976–1985 of all the US patents
whose title contained the exact name of the process i. Unlike PROCPAT , NOVELi i
does not distinguish between process and product patents. Thus, for instance, this
variable also includes the development of new uses of the product. NOVEL is theni
likely to be a measure of the rate of technological change. We use these two variables to
control for the maturity and complexity of the technology. Our objective here is to rule
out the possibility that the estimated coefficient of SEF FW reflects the effect that– i
developing countries are more likely to invest in older and more mature processes. In
7 Actual investment costs are reported for about 40% of the plants and these were used to calculate the
average cost per plant in a given process. We assume that the BUY and MAKE plants and the DOM and MNE
plants have the same average cost because we lack enough observations with cost figures to separately
estimate the average cost for them. However, for the few processes in which we had enough observations to
compute separate average costs, they were not statistically different across MAKE and BUY, and DOM and
MNE.
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turn, these two variables may also help to control for differences in the technology
transfer costs.
In addition, the database classifies plants into 21 chemical sub-sectors, which we
Ž .grouped in nine sector dummies listed in Appendix A . Our country-specific variables
include measures like GDP, population, energy consumption, openness, and human
capital, and are listed in Table 1 along with their source. Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics for the variables used in our analysis.
4.2. SIZE , BUY , and MAKE : specification and empirical resultsi j i j i j
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating three equations linking SIZE , BUY ,i j i j
and MAKE to the number of first world SEFs. We employed a logarithmic specifica-i j
tion of the form
log X sconstqaY qbZ qe 9Ž .Ž .i j j i i j
where X is SIZE , BUY , or MAKE , Y is a vector of country-specific character-i j i j i j i j j
istics, Z is a vector of process specific characteristics, and e is an error term. We notei i j
that the results are robust to alternative specifications such as linear or exponential. A
logarithmic specification allows the marginal effect of SEFs to diminish with the
Ž .number of SEFs, consistent with the model in Section 3. Bresnahan and Reiss 1991
have also shown that four to five suppliers in a market may be enough to make the
Table 1
List of country characteristics
GDP Real GDP of country in 1985 in billions of US dollars. Obtained by multiplyingj
Ž .per capita GDP of country Barro–Lee by population
Ž .POP Population of country in 1985 in millions Barro–Leej
Ž .ENERGY Total energy consumption of country 1985–1987 average in thousand metricj
Ž .tons of coal equivalent UN Statistical Yearbook
Ž .AREA Size of land in thousands square kilometers Barro–Lee . In regressions we alsoj
used AREA interacted with sector dummies for inorganic chemicals,j
Ž .agricultural chemicals, minerals and metallurgy ICHEM qAGRI qMMi i i
HKAP Human Capital. Average schooling years of population over 25 in the countryj
Ž .Barro–Lee
Ž .OPEN Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP of country in 1985 Barro–Leej
DOIL Dummy for countries with oil reserves interacted with dummy for processes ini j
the oil-refining sector. Countries with oil reserves: Algeria, Argentina,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Venezuela
Ž .Main countries with oil reserves listed in World Atlas, 1990
DGAS Dummy for countries with natural gas reserves interacted with dummy fori j
processes in the gas-processing sector. Countries with natural gas reserves:
ŽAlgeria, Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela Main countries
.with natural gas reserves listed in World Atlas, 1990.
Geographical area Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Central and South America, Far East.
dummies
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Number of Mean Std. dev. Min Max
observations
aSIZE 5168 76.4 430.5 0 17,751.7i j
aBUY 5168 73.6 421.8 0 17,751.7i j
aMAKE 5168 2.8 33.3 0 1321.1i j
aDOM 5168 61.6 364.8 0 13,313.7i j
aMNE 5168 14.8 128.6 0 4437.9i j
aSIZE FW 136 2733.1 6291.3 2.0 45,555.6– i
aCOST FW 136 76.2 146.2 0.8 1190– i
SEF FW 136 11.96 11.78 0 60– i
NOVEL 136 0.16 0.65 y0.78 3.6i
PROCPAT 136 61.19 60.65 1 345i
SLARGECO 136 0.50 0.22 0 1i
SGREEN 136 0.63 0.22 0.19 1i
bGDP 38 171.28 323.40 19.63 1918.79j
bPOP 38 84.90 204.40 1.70 1059.50j
bENERGY 38 61.26 126.70 1.48 765.18j
bAREA 38 1311.4 2039.4 1.0 9537.0j
bOPEN 38 0.46 0.47 0.1 2.64j
bHKAP 38 4.62 2.15 0.91 10.75j
a In millions of US dollars.
bSee Table 1.
Ž .market competitive the average number of SEFs in our sample is 12 . This suggests a
functional form that accounts for the diminishing returns of an extra supplier.8
As country-specific characteristics we used measures of the economic size of the
Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž ..country log GDP , log POP , log ENERGY , log AREA , measures of humanj j j j
Ž . Ž .capital HKAP and openness to trade OPEN , and geographic area dummies. We alsoj j
used dummy variables for the presence in the country of oil or gas reserves and
Žinteracted them with the sector dummies for oil refining plants and gas plants DOIL i j
. Ž .and DGAS . We also interacted log AREA with a dummy for the three sectorsi j j
Žinorganic chemicals, agricultural chemicals, and minerals and metallurgy ICHEM qi
.AGRI qMM . This is because larger countries are more likely to possess naturali i
resources that are the basis for production in inorganic chemicals and minerals.
Similarly, it is more likely that bigger countries have greater demand for agricultural
Ž .chemicals. Apart from log SEF FW , we used the following process-specific character-– i
Ž . Ž . Ž .istics as controls: sector dummies, log SIZE FW , log COST FW , log PROCPAT ,– –i i i
and NOVEL .i
Ž .Table 3 presents the results of our OLS estimations of Eq. 9 . The estimated
elasticities, with respect to SEF FW , of SIZE and BUY are large and statistically– i i j i j
8 Since our dependent variables can take zero values, we redefined SIZE as 1qSIZE , and to keep withi j i j
the adding up restriction we redefined BUY and MAKE as 0.5qBUY and 0.5qMAKE . This is just toi j i j i j i j
make the results of the three equations comparable. Using 1qBUY and 1qMAKE did not produce anyi j i j
significant difference.
11
Table 3
Ž .Determinants of total investment, AbuysB and AmakesB: OLS and Tobit Estimates log X sconstqaY qbZ q ei j j i i j
OLS TOBIT
SIZE BUY MAKE SIZE BUY MAKEi j i j i j i j i j i j
)) )) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Constant y10.57 1.17 y11.82 1.31 y3.42 0.45 y36.78 4.24 y40.52 4.91 y141.35 24.93
)) )) ) ) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DOIL 0.44 0.14 0.47 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.91 0.45 1.04 0.52 2.15 1.98i j
))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DGAS 0.31 0.21 0.34 0.24 y0.01 0.08 0.73 0.62 0.88 0.73 y2.51 2.77i j
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log HKAP y0.13 0.13 y0.05 0.03 y0.05 0.05 0.18 0.47 0.22 0.55 5.50 2.87j
)) )) )) ) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log GDP 0.40 0.12 0.37 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.88 0.43 0.78 0.50 7.41 2.32j
)Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log POP y0.10 0.09 y0.07 0.10 y0.08 0.04 y0.33 0.30 y0.26 0.35 y2.04 1.92j
)) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log ENERGY 0.34 0.06 0.39 0.14 y0.01 0.02 1.38 0.24 1.65 0.27 y0.16 1.24j
) )) )) ) ) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log AREA 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.04 y0.04 0.01 0.25 0.13 0.33 0.15 y2.61 0.77j
)) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .ICHEM qAGRI qMM = 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.13 0.56 0.15 0.90 0.62i i i
Ž .Log AREA j
) )) ) ) ) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .OPEN 0.29 0.13 0.39 0.07 y0.12 0.05 0.97 0.46 1.30 0.52 y11.55 3.73j
)) )) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SIZE FW 0.38 0.05 0.41 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.91 0.19 0.96 0.22 4.18 0.96– i
)) )) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log COST FW y0.32 0.06 y0.36 0.06 y0.07 0.02 y0.99 0.20 y1.09 0.23 y4.64 1.07– i
)) )) )) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .NOVEL y0.14 0.05 y0.16 0.05 y0.03 0.02 y0.37 0.15 y0.42 0.17 y1.13 0.71i
)) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log PROCPAT y0.14 0.03 y0.16 0.03 0.00 0.01 y0.43 0.10 y0.50 0.12 y0.10 0.48i
)) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SEF FW 0.46 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.02 0.02 1.77 0.19 2.09 0.22 y0.10 0.82– i
2Adjusted R 0.245 0.239 0.041
2Pseudo R 0.106 0.101 0.148
Number of observations 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168
Share of positive observations 0.33 0.27 0.03 0.33 0.27 0.03
Standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include sector dummies and dummies for geographical areas of country.
)Significant at 5% level.
))Significant at 1% level.
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Ž .significant 0.46 and 0.52, respectively . By contrast, the elasticity of MAKE is veryi j
small, and insignificantly different from zero. As predicted by Result 2 in our model, the
effect of SEFs is greater for the ‘buys’ than for the chemical plant investments as a
whole, and the effect on the ‘makes’ is almost zero.9
Since our dependent variables, SIZE , BUY and MAKE , are non-negative, wei j i j i j
also estimate a Tobit specification, whose results are also reported in Table 3. Notice
that the signs of the explanatory variables in the Tobit specifications are similar to the
ones in the OLS specifications. A more sophisticated estimation procedure that ad-
dresses the problem generated by the many zeros is presented in Section 4.3.
The basic result of Table 3 is that the effects of SEF FW on SIZE and BUY are– i i j i j
of sizable magnitude and they are statistically significant in spite of our extensive
controls for the size of the chemical process and country markets. Note also that our
Ž .measures of market size e.g., GDP , ENERGY , AREA , SIZE FW are generally–j j j i
significant in all Athree equations. Finally, in all three equations, the cost of a ‘typical’
Ž . Žplant COST FW , and our measures of technological change and complexity NOVEL– i i
.and PROCPAT have the expected sign. As predicted by the product lifecycle theory,i
more costly and technological advanced or complex processes, the smaller the invest-
ments in developing countries.
4.3. Measurement error, unobserÕed heterogeneity, and minimum inÕestment threshold
Our empirical procedure in the previous section raises three important issues. First,
our measure of potential suppliers ignores the possibility that an SEF operating in a
certain market could be a potential supplier for a related process. Our assumption is
certainly plausible10 but if invalid, it implies that SEF FW is measured with error. If– i
so, our estimates are likely to be biased towards zero, and the true effect is likely to be
Žlarger than the estimated effect. As a robustness check, we estimated a specification not
. Ž .reported here where we use SEFs operating in an entire sector e.g., synthetic fibers in
Ž .the first world as being potential suppliers for all processes e.g., polyester and nylon
belonging to that sector. The estimated impacts of the number of first world SEFS were
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. Therefore, our measure of the supply
of SEFs is not likely to be key to our empirical results.
A more important problem is that we are likely to measure N , the potential size ofi j
the market, with error. If this error is correlated with the number of first world SEFs our
estimates will be biased. For instance, if unobserved increases in the size of the
developing country markets induce more SEFs to enter to supply those technologies, an
endogeneity bias arises. However, both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests
that our estimates are not seriously biased.
9 The relatively large number of AzeroB observations in MAKE imply that the estimates of this equationi j
should be interpreted with caution.
10 For instance, our database shows that three different sets of SEFs supply the markets for three different
types of polyethylene—high-density, low-density, and linear low-density polyethylene—with very little
overlap.
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Most SEFs, and virtually all the major ones in the US, Europe and Japan, were
founded before World War II or right afterwards, and most chemical process technolo-
gies were developed 20 to 40 years ago when the developing country chemical markets
were still quite small or non-existent—and by that time SEFs had already accumulated
Ž .considerable expertise in these fields Arora and Gambardella, 1998 . Moreover, first
world SEFs maintain strong linkages with their country of origin, and from our database
we confirmed that it is rare for SEFs to supply engineering services to developing
countries in a process unless they also do so in their home markets. Nonetheless, it is
still possible that the growth of developing country markets induces further accumula-
tion of expertise by SEFs or that developing country demand prevented some SEFs from
exiting the industry. If so, unobserved variations in developing country demand for
chemical plants are correlated with our measure of SEFs.
The standard approach in this case is to find instruments for first world SEFs.
However, distinguishing among countries according to the extent to which they were
open to the inflow of foreign technologies is difficult. Even countries like South Korea
that have protected downstream markets have been open to imports of technology and
engineering services. Aggregate measures of openness cannot capture this subtlety.
Further, the rise of West European and Japanese SEFs has made the market for chemical
processes a truly global market. Even a country like Libya, which is not directly
supplied by American SEFs, is served by a large number of European and Japanese
SEFs. In short, there seems to be insufficient cross-country variation in the effective
supply of SEFs for this to be a useful way to identify their impact.
By contrast, differences across processes in the nature of the technology have been an
important source of variations in the number of SEFs.11 We use two instruments that
Žexploit the variation in the composition of first world demand for SEFs recall also that
.we control for the size of the first world market . SLARGECO is the share of totali
investment in the first world in process i undertaken by the 200 largest non-oil
companies. SGREEN is the ratio between the number of greenfield plants and the sumi
of greenfield, expanded and revamped plants in process i in the first world. The former
instrument, SLARGECO , is justified by the fact that the top chemical companies arei
more likely to have the capabilities to produce their engineering services in-house.
Hence, SLARGECO should be negative correlated with SEF FW. The top 200 non-oil–i i
companies include virtually all the important chemical companies in the first world. We
exclude oil companies because historically oil companies have made systematic use of
Ž . 12SEFs see Arora et al., 1998 .
The second instrument, SGREEN , has a similar justification. Greenfield plants arei
likely to be more complex projects than mere expansions or revamping of existing
capacities. As a result, they are more likely to require the work of specialist contractors.
It is also likely that the company that owns the plant has greater knowledge about the
11 For instance, the scientific basis for some processes is better understood and codified, which encourages
specialization and increases the number of SEFs.
12 Ž .We also tried the share of first world plants by the chemical andror oil companies among the top 50 and
top 100 companies in terms of first world plants. Our results are robust to such variations.
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idiosyncrasies of the plant, and thus, it is in a better position to expand or revamp.
Hence, SGREEN should be positive correlated with SEF FW. In sum, we have two–i i
instruments that are likely to affect the demand for SEF services in the first world but
are uncorrelated with unmeasured variations in market size in developing countries.
Table 4 shows, as expected, that first world SEFs are negatively correlated with the
share of large firms, and positively correlated with the share of greenfield plants.
Table 5 presents the results of a GMM estimation of the SIZE equation. For ease ofi j
comparison, we also reports the OLS regression for SIZE from Table 3, and thei j
chi-square statistics of a Hausman specification test comparing the OLS and GMM
Ž .estimates see Hausman, 1978, for details . Table 5 shows that the potential endogeneity
bias of SEF FW is quite modest. Our GMM estimator of the elasticity with respect to– i
SEF FW is 0.45, which is very close to our original OLS estimate of 0.46. To get a– i
sense of the order of magnitude of the impact, one can use the GMM estimate to
compute the effect of one additional SEF in a typical process market on the expected
total dollar value of investment in the developing countries in that process market.
Average investment in a process-country market is US$76.4 million, whereas the
average number of first world SEFs in a process market is 12. Therefore, an addition
Ž .SEF would increase investment by US$ 0.45P76.4r12 millionsUS$2.86 million. For
our set of 38 LDCs this amounts to US$109 million, i.e., little less than one extra plant
Žover the 10-year period in the 38 countries the average cost of a plant in LDCs is about
Table 4
Ž .OLS estimation: Dependent variable—Log SEF FW– i
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
)Constant y0.95 0.38
SECTOR DUMMIES:
Agriculture 0.23 0.26
Gas 0.43 0.24
))Oil Refining 0.60 0.23
Organic chemicals 0.00 0.24
Petrochemicals 0.35 0.22
Minerals and metallurgy y0.24 0.26
Plastics and rubber 0.15 0.26
Inorganic chemicals 0.08 0.27
NOVEL y0.15 0.08i
Ž .Log PROCPAT y0.03 0.05i
))SIZE FW 0.79 0.06– i
))SLARGECO y0.65 0.27i
)SGREEN 0.45 0.23i
))Ž .Log COST FW y0.69 0.08– i
Number of observations 136
2Adjusted R 0.73
Standard errors in parenthesis.
)Significant at 5% level.
))Significant at 1% level.
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Table 5
Impact of first world SEFs on investment in chemical plant in developing countries SIZE : OLS, GMM andi j
generalized Tobit estimates
OLS GMM Generalized Tobit
Ž .Prob SIZE )0 SIZEi j i j
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Constant y10.57 1.17 y10.52 1.11 y8.33 1.00 y7.62 6.62
)) )) ) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DOIL 0.44 0.14 0.43 0.15 0.21 0.11 0.35 0.17i j
)Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DGAS 0.31 0.21 0.35 0.28 0.10 0.17 0.59 0.29i j
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log HKAP y0.13 0.13 y0.15 0.12 0.02 0.11 y0.13 0.22j
)) )) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log GDP 0.40 0.12 0.39 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.35 0.18j
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log POP y0.10 0.09 y0.11 0.10 y0.05 0.07 y0.08 0.11j
)) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log ENERGY 0.34 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.21 0.23j
) ) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log AREA 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.08j
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .ICHEM qAGRI qMM = 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.08i i i
Ž .Log AREA j
) ) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .OPEN 0.29 0.13 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.11 0.16 0.29j
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SIZE FW 0.38 0.05 0.37 0.14 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.19– i
)) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log COST FW y0.32 0.06 y0.31 0.13 y0.30 0.05 0.39 0.25– i
)) )) ) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .NOVEL y0.14 0.05 y0.16 0.05 y0.08 0.04 y0.13 0.06i
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log PROCPAT y0.14 0.03 y0.14 0.03 y0.09 0.02 y0.12 0.09i
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SEF FW 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.17 0.39 0.05 0.52 0.28– i
Hausman test statistic for 0.00
Ž .Log SEF FW– i
Number of observations 5168 5168 5168 1448
Standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include sector dummies and dummies for geographical areas of
Ž .country. All variables and SLARGECO and SGREEN used as instruments for Log SEF FW in GMM:i i – i
Hausman test statistic computed as the square of the difference between the OLS and GMM estimates, divided
by the difference between their variances.
)Significant at 5% level.
))Significant at 1% level.
.US$119 million . Notice that this effect is larger for larger countries like India and
China and smaller for smaller countries, as shown in Fig. 2.
Finally, a third econometric issue that we noted in Section 4.2 arises from the
presence of a censored dependent variable. Indeed, SIZE shows a very large fraction ofi j
Ž .‘zero’ observations about 70% . In turn, a ‘zero’ observation has an economic
interpretation. It is consistent with the idea that there exists a threshold level below
which setting up a chemical plant is not economically profitable. To capture this
Ž .additional subtlety we use a generalized Tobit model see Amemiya, 1985 . This
procedure estimates simultaneously a Probit model where the regressors explain the
probability to observe a positive value for the dependent variable and an OLS model
where the regressors explain, for positive observations alone, the magnitude of the
dependent variable. Implicitly this implies that the threshold below which investing is
not profitable is allowed to vary across observations. Results of this specification are
also reported in Table 5. The results imply that first world SEFs increase the probability
of investment and, given the threshold, increase investment as well.
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Fig. 2. Impact of an additional SEF. Additional investment per process, by country, in millions of US dollars.
4.4. The differential effect of SEFs on deÕeloping country and multinational firms
If our story is correct, then Result 3 implies that SEFs ought to benefit developing
country firms much more than they benefit first world MNEs, which are likely to have
substantial in-house technological capability. We estimated two equations for the total
dollar investment by domestic firms and MNEs using the same specification and
variables employed earlier. Table 6 presents the results of these estimations using least
Ž .squares, method of moments and Tobit OLS, GMM, Tobit , where in the GMM we use
SLARGECO and SGREEN as instruments.13i i
The key result in Table 6 is that the estimates of the impact of first world SEFs are
sizable and significant in the domestic firm equation, whereas they are small, statisti-
cally insignificant and even negative in the MNE equation, in all the three specifications
13 The relatively sparse observations on MNE investment prevented us from estimating a generalized Tobit
specification for this equation.
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Table 6
Ž .Investments by MNE and developing country firms in developing countries: DOM , MNE —OLS, GMM and Tobit estimates log X sconstqaY qbZ q ei j i j i j j i i j
DOM MNEi j i j
OLS GMM TOBIT OLS GMM TOBIT
)) )) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Constant y10.20 1.26 y10.11 1.15 y46.01 5.75 y4.66 0.84 y4.91 0.95 y41.97 9.54
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DOIL 0.63 0.15 0.61 0.17 1.87 0.59 y0.11 0.10 y0.11 0.10 y1.94 1.11i j
)Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DGAS 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.30 0.35 0.84 0.33 0.15 0.33 0.22 1.98 1.33i j
)) )) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log HKAP 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14 1.11 0.62 y0.37 0.10 y0.37 0.09 y2.89 1.14j
)) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log GDP 0.25 0.13 0.24 0.12 1.03 0.58 0.24 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.66 0.98j
)) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log POP 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 y0.24 0.40 y0.18 0.06 y0.18 0.07 y1.32 0.73j
)) )) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log ENERGY 0.33 0.07 0.34 0.06 1.42 0.31 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.04 2.51 0.57j
)) )) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log AREA 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.42 0.17 y0.00 0.03 y0.00 0.02 0.09 0.31j
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .ICHEM qAGRI qMM = 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.70 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.33 0.27i i i
Ž .Log AREA j
) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .OPEN 0.32 0.14 0.31 0.13 0.85 0.63 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.92 1.05j
)) ) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SIZE FW 0.38 0.06 0.34 0.15 1.10 0.25 0.23 0.04 0.43 0.10 2.33 0.44– i
)) ) )) )) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log COST FW y0.33 0.06 y0.29 0.13 y1.18 0.27 y0.22 0.04 y0.40 0.09 y2.73 0.48– i
)) ) ) ) )) )Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .NOVEL y0.15 0.05 y0.16 0.06 y0.43 0.19 y0.08 0.03 y0.13 0.04 y0.90 0.37i
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log PROCPAT y0.16 0.03 y0.15 0.03 y0.60 0.13 y0.02 0.02 y0.02 0.02 y0.18 0.23i
)) )) ))Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Log SEF FW 0.44 0.05 0.48 0.18 2.12 0.26 0.06 0.04 y0.20 0.12 0.54 0.43– i
2Adjusted R 0.217 0.068
2Pseudo R 0.103 0.071
Hausman test statistic for 0.05 5.76
Ž .Log SEF FW– i
Number of observations 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168
Share of positive observations 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.09
Standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include sector dummies and dummies for geographical areas of country. All variables and SLARGECO and SGREENi i
Ž .used as instruments for Log SEF FW in GMM: Hausman test statistic computed as the square of the difference between the OLS and GMM estimates, divided by– i
the difference between their variances.
)Significant at 5% level.
))Significant at 1% level.
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estimated. This is an interesting result for it suggests that SEFs are likely to have
encouraged entry of firms from developing country into new chemical markets by
providing access to chemical technologies. This result is consistent with other findings
that the presence of SEFs lowers entry barriers and makes markets more competitive
Ž .e.g., Lieberman, 1987 . Further, that SEFs do not have a similar impact on MNE
investment suggests that first world SEFs are a sources of increased competition for the
very same first world companies that gave rise to these SEFs in earlier periods.
5. Conclusions
Technological spillovers play an important role in the process of economic growth
Ž .see Griliches, 1979; Jaffe, 1986, or Coe and Helpman, 1995 . However, the typical
description of the mechanism of these spillovers is, in Alfred Marshall’s often used
phrase, one where Athe secrets . . . are in the airB. Important as this ethereal mechanism
may be, there are other mechanisms, more material and more amenable to economic
analysis, through which technology is transferred across sectors and countries. What
may sometimes appear as spillovers may be the working of an upstream sector of
specialized technology suppliers. Though market mediated, the technology flow has real
benefits for recipients, and is likely a mechanism through which early users benefit
latecomers, lead sectors benefit sectors that arise later, and leaders benefit follower
countries.
Ž .The economics of this mechanism is very simple. As Romer 1990 has emphasized,
the development of technological capability is a fixed cost activity, while the productive
Ž .application of the technological capability is a low marginal cost activity. In our story,
firms in the upstream sector invest in developing technology and plant design. If the
upstream sector is competitive, then existing downstream firms ultimately pay for these
investment costs. Once incurred the costs are sunk. However, the expertise and the
technologies developed are process—and not location—specific, and thus, can subse-
quently be made available to downstream firms in other countries. Moreover, competi-
tion between suppliers implies that the expertise and technology will be made available
to prices close to marginal cost of transfer.
Our empirical results are consistent with the notion that the greater the number of
technology suppliers, the more attractive the terms on which technology is supplied and,
all else held constant, the more likely buyers are to invest. We do not mean to suggest
that the observed rates of investment in chemical plants in developing countries are
being fueled solely by specialist process technology suppliers from the first world and
could not be achieved without them. Rather, we interpret our results as suggesting that
that the investment is taking place earlier and more rapidly than if developing countries
had to rely solely upon chemical producers in the first world to transfer the technology,
or even worse, if they had to ‘re-invent the wheel’—i.e., develop process technologies
and the broader engineering expertise required to design and construct chemical plants
domestically. In short, the vertical organization of industry in the first world ‘matters’
not just for the growth of the first world but also for the growth of other nations.
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Appendix A. Description of the data
A.1. Plant data
ŽOur main source of plant level data is Chemical Age Project File Chemical Age
Ž . .Project File CAPF , 1989 , a data base compiled by Pergamon, London. CAPF provides
information on 20,581 plants announced or constructed all over the world in the broadly
defined chemical sector during 1980–1989. The database is organized by plants. It
reports the name of the company that ordered the plant, the name of the engineering
Ž .company for that plant or ‘staff’ for in-house engineering , the location of the plant
Ž .city and country , the name of the chemical process or of the product being produced,
the date in which the investment was first reported in the specialized trade press, along
with other information. For about 40% of the plants, CAPF also reports the total cost of
investment in the plant in US million dollars. Finally, the database reports the status of
the plant along with the date in which the information was last updated. In most of the
cases the information was updated in 1988–1989, which suggests that we can reasonably
assume that this was the status of the plant at the end of our sample period. There are
14,893 plants in the database that are either ‘completed’ or ‘under construction’. The
others are ‘planned’, ‘under study’, ‘abandoned’, ‘canceled’, ‘delayed’, or others.
We focused our analysis on the plants that were either completed or under construc-
tion. Thus, SIZE , BUY , MAKE , DOM , MNE , and SIZE FW were obtained by–i j i j i j i j i j i
using only the 14,893 plants that are completed or constructed. In counting SEF FW ,– i
we used information from all the 20,581 plants in the database. This is because even
plants that were planned, under study, abandoned, or other, provided useful information
about whether a given SEF was a potential supplier for that technology. For similar
reason, we used all the available information about plant costs to compute COST FW– i
and the average plant investment cost in LDCs to compute the dollar values of the
variables mentioned above. The vast majority of the firms counted in SEF FW are– i
Žindependent SEFs, or they engineering subsidiaries of larger chemical groups especially
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.for the European and Japanese companies . Since these normally act as independent
companies on the open market, they can also be considered as full-fledged SEFs. There
Ž .are a few chemical firms that provide engineering services to other non-affiliated
chemical companies. We also included them as potential suppliers of engineering
services for that process.
A.2. Chemical processes
CAPF plants cover 2081 different chemical processes. However, we focused our
analysis on the 136 largest processes with 20 or more plants in the database. Gathering
information for all processes for our measures of technological novelty and complexity,
is very difficult, and often, prohibitively so. In fact, our sample is a comprehensive set
of all the important and widely diffused chemical technologies in the world. It covers
10,012 plants that are completed or in construction, i.e., almost 70% of all the 14,893
plants completed or in construction in the data base. In addition, in an earlier working
paper we report qualitatively similar empirical results using a larger sample of processes,
Ž .albeit without the extensive controls that we use here Arora et al., 1996 . We also
performed similar analyses using a cross-section of all the 2081 processes and aggregate
variables for the LDCs as a whole. Again, the qualitative results did not change.
A.3. Sectors
ŽCAPF classifies its plants in the following 21 sectors in parenthesis the number of
.plants that are completed or under construction in each sector : Agricultural Chemicals
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .116 , Air Separation 596 , Coal Refining 32 , Desalination 40 , Engineering Materi-
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .als 110 , Environmental Technologies 75 , Fertilizers 1000 , Food Products 308 ,
Ž . Ž . Ž .Gas Handling 1014 , Inorganic Chemicals 1249 , Industrial Gases 613 , Minerals and
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Metallurgy 532 , Miscellaneous 505 , Organic Chemicals 1114 , Oil Refining 2246 ,
Ž . Ž . Ž .Petrochemicals 2155 , Pharmaceuticals 745 , Plastics and Rubber 1474 , Pulp and
Ž . Ž . Ž .Paper 396 , Synthetic Fuels 135 , Textiles and Fibers 438 . The sector dummies that
we actually used in all our regressions were obtained, however, after aggregating these
21 sectors in nine classes of relatively homogeneous sectors. The nine aggregate sectors
are OIL REFINING, PETROCHEMICALS, MINERALS and METALLURGY, PLAS-
ŽTICS and RUBBER, INORGANIC CHEMICALS, AGRICULTURE Agricultural
. Ž .Chemicals and Fertilizers , GAS Gas Handling, Air Separation, and Industrial Gases ,
ŽORGANIC CHEMICALS Organic Chemicals, Explosives, Textile and Fibers, Food
. Ž .Products, and Pharmaceuticals , and MISCELLANEOUS all the rest .
A.4. Nationality of companies and subsidiaries
Ž .We used Predicast’s 1991 and other company thesauruses to group all the compa-
nies that were subsidiaries of other companies in the data base under the names of their
mothers companies, and assign nationalities to companies. We treated the SEFs that
were subsidiaries of larger chemical groups as independent firms. However, when an
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SEFs provided services for its parent company, this was counted as a ‘make’. We do not
find any SEFs from LDCs operating in the first world.
A.5. Limitation of the data base
CAPF is a commercial data base, and is constructed from various sources such as
questionnaires and reports in the trade press. Its vast coverage suggests that biases are
unlikely. Its most serious limitation is that for about 17% of the plants in our sample the
name of the engineering company is not given. Conversations with data providers in the
industry suggested that these blanks could arise for a number of reasons. Companies
Žmay still be looking for suitable engineers including possibly doing the engineering
.in-house , or they do not want to disclose the name, or the information is simply
missing. However, we also used information about these plants from another database
Ž .Hydrocarbon Processing Unit-HPI, compiled by Gulf Publishing, TX to see whether
we could classify the blanks as ‘buys’ or ‘makes’. The details of this diagnostic check
are available from the authors upon request. The check was inconclusive because a large
number of the identified plants in the other database were still blanks. However, since
most of the identified plants that did report the name of an engineering company in the
other data base were ‘buys’, our check ruled out the possibility that the blanks are
predominately ‘makes’.
We performed all our empirical analyses under different assumptions about the
blanks—i.e., all the blanks are ‘buys’, all the blanks are ‘makes’, the blanks are 50%
‘buys’ and 50% ‘makes’, the blanks are distributed between ‘buys’ and ‘makes’ in the
Žsame proportion as in the case in which the name of the engineering company or
.‘staff’ is observed. The results presented here are those where we assume that all the
blanks are ‘buys’. It turns out that all other assumptions about the blanks had even more
favorable results for our theory.
A.6. Construction of PROCPATi
PROCPAT was constructed as follows. We selected all relevant patents using ai
keyword search with the process as the keyword. From these, we selected and read the
Ž .full abstracts of patents that exactly fit our criterion. The patent classes and sub-classes
into which these patents were classified were examined to ensure that the invention was
in fact a process invention. These subclasses of the US patent classification system were
used along with the process name as the basis for Boolean queries of the US patent
Ždatabase to generate the final set of patents, one set for each process. The details of the
. ŽBoolean queries are available upon request. The titles and some abstracts selected at
.random of the patents in the final sample for each process were examined to ensure that
the final sample did not contain irrelevant patents.
A.7. Countries
In all our analyses, and for all the variables that we constructed, we defined first
world to be all the OECD countries except Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
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Poland, South Korea and Turkey. These countries joined the OECD only very recently
and for our purposes, it was more appropriate to include them in the LDC category.
Therefore, our first world countries are all the Western European countries, the USA and
Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The 38 countries in our sample are: Algeria,
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia.
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